By Eleanor Beevor
Yesterday, Israel revealed that its long-awaited F-35 stealth fighter jets are now operational. This announcement represents a significant technological upgrade for the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF).
Despite the design flaws and budgetary overruns that contractor Lockheed Martin encountered when building it, the F-35 has advanced data gathering mechanisms of its own, as well as radar evasion systems. But the F-35 announcement could also be read as a warning to Iran, or even as a new beat of the war drums.
Nuclearization
As tension between Iran and Israel ratchets up, commentators are asking where the military advantage lies, and what this means for regional nuclearization. Will aggression from Israel push Iran out of a weakened JCPOA nuclear agreement, and down the path of developing nuclear weapons?
If so, how would Iran use such weapons, and how long would it take to develop them? And what else does Iran have in its arsenal to use against the IDF, one of the most effective militaries in the world, with nuclear power to boot?
Iran proud to show its military might as a military brass band shows at beginning of opening Army Day Parade 18 April, 2018. (AFP/File Photo)
Answering these questions requires a close look at Iran’s ballistic missiles. (A ballistic missile differs from a cruise missile because of its trajectory. Whilst a cruise missile is rocket-propelled and travels in a horizontal line, a ballistic missile travels in an arc, up into the high levels of the earth’s atmosphere, before falling back towards its target. Where it falls depends on the speed with which it is fired upwards, and the resultant gravitational pull as it falls.)
Iran’s manufacturing and use of ballistic missiles has been one of the major points of contention for opponents of the JCPOA. Whilst missile use by Tehran was not limited under the terms of the JCPOA, many of the deals critics believe that it should have been.
There is, however, a separate UN Security Council Resolution, number 2231, which prohibits Iran from undertaking “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology”.
Nevertheless, Iran has conducted missile tests since the resolution was struck. Though Tehran claims that it has not violated the resolution since the missiles were not intended for nuclear purposes, there are areas of doubt. For one thing, some diplomats fear that the language of the resolution is too vague to allow for punitive measures. And for another, some of Iran’s ballistic missiles are technically capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
An Iranian ballistic missile (AFP/File Photo)
This does not necessarily mean that they were designed for this purpose, nor that will they be used for such. However, the possibility is concerning. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) produced a detailed report weighing up the nuclear risks that Iran’s missiles represent. Al Bawaba spoke to its authors to find out what these missiles mean for a potential conflict.
13 varieties of ballistic missiles
Out of 13 varieties of ballistic missiles in Iran’s arsenal, the majority appear to have been designed with conventional rather than nuclear weapons in mind. According to Michael Elleman, IISS’s Senior Fellow for Missile Defence, four varieties of Iranian missile could probably carry nuclear payloads. He told Al Bawaba:
“Only Iran’s Shahab-3 and Khorramshahr missiles appear to have been designed to be capable of nuclear delivery. However, if Iran were to fashion a nuclear weapon today, it could modify the nose cones for its Ghadr and Sajjil missiles for nuclear use. It is unclear if Iran has a bomb design that would fit on the Shahab-1, Shahab- 2 or Qiam missiles. Current bomb design does not, but this could change. I believe Shahab-3, Ghadr and Sajjil represent the biggest threat, if armed with a nuclear weapon. Khorramshahr, if developed over the next three to five years, would have to be included.”
Iran is, thankfully, still operating within the confines of the JCPOA, while Russia, China and the deal’s European signatories scramble to save the agreement. Europe is proving assertive in the face of American violation of the deal.
It has drawn up a plan to prohibit EU-based companies from complying with American sanctions. EU leaders are also reportedly considering buying Iranian oil in Euros rather than dollars. China and Russia also have much to offer Iran, even within the confines of new sanctions. Still, as Iran feels increasingly vulnerable in the face of Israeli and Saudi aggression, it will be weighing up the benefits of a weakened JCPOA against the security that a nuclear deterrent might offer.
JCPOA collapse and NPT
The collapse of the JCPOA would not automatically kick-start Iranian nuclear weapons development. As it stands, there are other restrictions that Tehran would have to contend with. Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund, the co-director of the Global Security Program of the Union of Concerned Scientists and a specialist in nuclear and missile technology, told Al Bawaba:
“Iran is a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits it from developing or building nuclear weapons. Under the NPT, the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) verifies that any nuclear power or research facilities are not being used for weapons purposes. For some types of facilities, this includes year-round on-site inspectors. None of this will change if the JCPOA falls apart. That agreement placed additional restrictions on Iran’s operation of its nuclear facilities and its stockpiles of some types of nuclear materials, so that if Iran pulled out of the NPT to try to build a nuclear weapon, it would take longer for Iran to do so, and give the international community more time to respond.”
- An Iranian military truck carries parts of a S-300 air defence missile system. This was proudly displayed
- during Iran's Army Day parade on 18 April, 2018. (AFP/File Photo)
Thus if Iran were to try and build nuclear warheads, it would either have to publically pull out of the NPT and risk the repercussions, or try and develop them covertly. But whilst it could not make nuclear warheads overnight, it might be able to develop them in the not-too distant future. Mark Fitzpatrick, the Executive Director of IISS Americas, and the co-author of the report on Iranian missiles, explained to Al Bawaba:
“If the JCPOA goes away, and with it the limits on Iran’s nuclear program, then Iran will be able more quickly, and without intrusive international inspections, to resume building a capability to quickly produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Actually producing nuclear weapons would take a couple of years, however. Having the missiles already on hand would then provide a ready means of delivering nuclear weapons. The missiles are already there and won’t themselves need much modification. It’s the warhead manufacture that would present Iran with the greatest technical challenge.”
War escalation with Israel
As things stand now then, international obstacles, a potential future for the JCPOA, and the technical difficulties of nuclear weapon development may keep Iran from veering down that path. However, a spat between Israel and Iran with conventional weapons carries a real risk of escalating into full-blown war, a scenario which would radically change Tehran’s incentives to comply with nuclear restrictions.
Even with conventional weapons, both countries could do some serious damage. Israel’s military might is considerable, and its military budget is usually between three and five times the size of that of Iran. But Iran’s friendly proxies, and its arsenal of non-nuclear missiles could significantly disrupt Israeli operations if a strike was well-orchestrated.
Michael Elleman added: “Presently, the many Fateh-110 close-range missiles Iran has transferred to Hezbollah and Syria represent the greatest risk. The Fateh-110 is not as accurate as Iran claims, though if launched in large numbers, could inflict great damage on Israel, and possibly Israel’s military capabilities. For instance, they could seriously disrupt air force sortie generation at airfields within 250 km of Lebanese territory.”
The likelier that war with Israel or its neighbours becomes, the likelier a nuclear Iran becomes. If the situation de-escalates and the JCPOA endures, then the costs to Iran of actually developing nuclear weapons will probably continue to outweigh the benefits.
But the more that America and Israel threaten it, the more likely Tehran is to lean towards the nuclear option. History has repeatedly shown us that hawkishness towards Iran empowers the hardliners. It is they who will take charge if the conflict gets worse, and then even worse after that if nuclear weapons rear their ugly warheads.
